Secure collaboration with E2EE & capabilities

Brooklyn Zelenka — @expede

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github.com/expede Vancouver

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- * Lead the **Keyhive** project at **Ink & Switch**
 - Shout out to John Mumm & Alex Good
 - ...and many others in the design loop
- Spec editor for UCAN distributed auth system
- Wrote some auth EIPs in my misspent youth
- PLs and DSys are my jam



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Good ThingsTM from LFC'24



Photo Credit: Nik Graf

Safe in the Keyhive Topics & Depth

Topics & Depth

Trust-Minimised Sync

Encryption

Capabilities

Topics & Depth



Trust-Minimised Sync

Encryption

Capabilities

Topics & Depth



Trust-Minimised Sync

Encryption

Capabilities

super into caps?

Happy to geek out Later!

Topics & Depth



Trust-Minimised Sync



Encryption

Capabilities

Super into caps?

Happy to geek out later!

Why an Auth Layer?

Motivation





What if Signal... but for everything else

Human Factors

Motivation Human Factors

Familiar user experience €

Live collaboration speed
Interchangeable sync servers
Automatic (no manual merges) €

Human Factors

How much can you trust server?

a random sync server?

Familiar user experience
Live collaboration speed
Interchangeable sync servers
Automatic (no manual merges)

How Close to Wikipedia Scale?

How Close to Wikipedia Scale?

100,000s interlinked docs 10,000s readers 1000s writers 1000s writers 100s admins 2


Paranoia Level "Informal Threat Model"


Paranoia Level "Informal Threat Model"

Secure against the FBIbut not the NSA ?


Motivation "Boring is Good, Actually"


"Boring is Good, Actually"





"Boring is Good, Actually"








If we do our job well, it'll seem "familiar" and "boring"

Motivation Unix Philosophy










Auth-as-Place Cloud Auth



Cloud Auth Flow





Heri's to the congrescence.


The mufils. The notels.

The troublemakers. The round gage in the hole.


The ones red
defferently hol







































































Cloud: Auth-as-Place

Cloud: Auth-as-Place






Cloud: Auth-as-Place


"Over Here"



"Over There"




Cloud: Auth-as-Place



"Over there" is a bottleneck / hard to scale


Playing By New Rules & Local Context

Adds & Removals Over Time































Auth-as-Data: "Auth <u>Must</u> Travel with Data" 🛍

"Auth Here" "Data Here"



"Auth There" "Data There"






































Cloud


Gloud



Gloud



Gloud



Securing Data Wherever It Happens To Be


End-to-End Encryption





End-to-End Encryption

Tradeoffs

Tradeoffs











End-to-End Encryption What To Encrypt?





























































End-to-End Encryption Causal Keys











End-to-End Encryption Causal Decrypt




















→BeeKEM


AKA: how this key magically appears for the right users only












Reconstruct



Encryption is Not Enough

Encryption is Not Enough



The Atlantic

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The Trump Administration Accidentally Texted Me Its War Plans

U.S. national-security leaders included me in a group chat about upcoming military strikes in Yemen. I didn't think it could be real. Then the bombs started falling.

By Jeffrey Goldberg

The "IYKYK" Principal

The "IYKYK" Principal

Data wants to be free.
You can't claw back leaked bytes.
Once they know, they know.

End-to-End Encryption


The "IYKYK" Principal


Data wants to be free. You can't claw back leaked bytes. Once they know, they know.


e.g. About your
e.g. About your
"surprise birthday party"


Protecting Writes & Agreeing on Membership

































































Example High Level API

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```
authedDocHandle.change(doc ⇒ {
  doc.event = "Local First Conf"
  doc.city = "Berlin"
})
```

Example High Level API

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authedDocHandle.change(doc ⇒ {
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authedDocHandle.addMember(alice, ADMIN)

Example High Level API


```
authedDocHandle.change(doc ⇒ {
  doc.event = "Local First Conf"
  doc.city = "Berlin"
})
```

authedDocHandle.addMember(alice, ADMIN)
authedDocHandle.removeMember(bob)

Convergent Capabilities **Groups**











































Alice's


Laptop











33333333 **Convergent Capabilities** LaTeX Groups Meeting Paper Notes Write • Read Kid's Ink & Switch Homework (Patchwork) Group **Admin** "Bob" "Alice" Group Group **Admin Admin** Alice's Alice's Phone Laptop






























Weap Up

Wrap Up But Wait, There's More!

Wrap Up

But Wait, There's More!

- Mutation Control
 - Convergent capabilities
 - Concurrent revocation
- Read Control
 - End-to-end encryption
 - Causal encryption
- Further Reading
 - Concurrency-friendly variant of MLS
 - Revocation & admin revocation cycle breaking











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